This paper is intended to be the elaboration of an idea which had a prominent place in ancient philosophy though it apparently has had few adherents. This idea we shall call the Socrates Principle. It is the hypothesis that no man is, of himself, wise.
The elaboration must begin with definitions. We take “man” to mean any human being. We define “wisdom” to be the ability to designate in advance the best course of action to pursue in any practical decision situation in which any human being finds himself or herself. We further stipulate: 1) that this wisdom must use only human resources, individual or collective; 2) that the designation must be a specific selection of an identifiable course of action which is readily differentiated from the alternatives available in the situation; 3) that “best course of action” means a decision which is rationally sure at the time the decision is made; 4) that there is a long-term vindication of the correctness of that decision in the experience of the decision maker, and 5) that a specific criterion of “best” is used, using a criterion other than that of “anything.”
Those definitions and stipulations give specific meaning to the principle that no man is wise. They also decrease the difficult of demonstrating the rational certitude of the principle. They are an attempt to lay out the conditions which must obtain for any person to take seriously a rational, ethical stance. If the Socrates principle holds, there can be no such thing as a defensible, rational, ethical system. Let us now examine the stipulations more closely.
Limiting human wisdom to human resources is simply to place the problem of being wise squarely in the lap of every responsible, thinking person. To act intelligently is to act with some result, some good in mind. To act wisely is to act to attain that goal. Every act either brings one measurably closer to that goal or not. Since for most persons the only resources they acknowledge are human resources, this stipulation is simply a means of highlighting the issue.
Stipulating that wisdom be the designation of a specific action among identifiable alternatives is the attempt to reduce ambiguity. It puts behavioral if not measurable limitations as to what may count as a choice. This facilitates description which facilitates the historicity of the before and after aspects of the choosing—acting–resulting sequence of events.
To insist that the action chosen be rationally justified is the need to make room for an ethical stance. If that stance does not guide specific action, it is not an ethical stance. If one’s choice derives from his ethical position and is justified on the basis of the ethical position, then we have the possibility of an empirical validation of the ethical position.
The requirement of long-term vindication of the decision is the requirement of empirical validation. The decision either brings one measurably closer to attaining one’s goal or it does not. The length of time which must pass for the results to be construed as long-term is arbitrary, but surely has the lower limit of allowing one to compare one choice with another as to their goal-gaining efficacy. What counts as empirical we will specify as observable and repeatable within the observer’s personal experience. The wider and more usual requirement of interpersonal agreement, which is usual in science, we shall exclude on the ground that ethics would then be reduced to science. There seems to be value in allowing an individual to judge the efficacy of his own decisions since he is the recipient of the consequences of all of his personal choices.
The final stipulation of a goal which is specific is the attempt to differentiate ethics from epistemology. Rather than bring a record of any and all experience, the ethical experience is thus by definition instrumental, the means or not, to some identifiable end or goal.
In the hope that the preceeding remarks have made the hypothesis we are scrutinizing sufficiently clear, we now proceed to the demonstration of the hypothesis.
The demonstration will focus on the requirement that a given decision must be rationally justified as the best decision to make in a given circumstance. It proceeds by pointing out that in good Heraclitan terms one can never encounter exactly the same decision situation twice. Because every human decision situation is unique, we cannot use induction to steady our decision making. To know that a given decision is best in advance we must see that:
1) it is rationally justified by the ethical system one uses as a guide to action;
2) it clearly will be efficacious in bringing one closer to attainment of the goal sought; and
3) it is clearly superior to every other choice which could be made as a means to that goal seen in the frame of the person’s ethical system or of any other ethical system.
Let us now examine those three requirements in greater depth.
The requirement that the decision must be rationally justified in one’s ethical system is to note first that one must use some ethical system in the attempt to be wise, otherwise there is no meaning to the word wise. It is also to note that there must be a sequence of logical thought which makes the choice meet a criterion of permissibility or desirability within the ethical system. This will usually be of the nature of a general statement of what is good or desirable in the system as a universal under which the choice in question is subsumed either as an instance of the universal or an instrumentality by which to attain an instance of the universal.
To require that the choice will be efficacious in bringing one closer to one’s goal is the need to know what works and what doesn’t work in the world. It is almost the requirement of omniscience, but is saved from that need by the act that one can have good ground for expecting something to work, to be instrumental, without having to know everything that works.
In the third requirement, however, there is no escape from the necessity of omniscience. To know that a choice is best is to foresee that not only is the choice efficacious, but also that it is being compared with all other possible efficacious choices in longitudinal strategies as well as in immediate tactics. To use the analogy of chess, the choice is vindicated as best only if it is a possible move which maximizes one’s chance of winning among all possible move and sequence-of-move choices.
The proof of the hypothesis that no man is wise rests squarely upon the proposition that no man is omniscient, which omniscience is the precondition for being able to make the best choice of action, among all possible actions among all possible strategies of action in the known contingencies of a virtually infinite universe.
Assuming that the hypothesis that no man is wise is now proven, we now proceed to explicate some of the consequences which ensue from the truth of that proposition.
Corollary 1. A person may come closer to wisdom, as the following factors increasingly obtain, singly or in concert.
a. The more he knows about the universe, both its usual operations and the specific state variables at any given moment, the wiser he can become.
b. The more he understands his own potential courses of action, the wiser he can become.
c. The fewer are the variables with which he has to deal (the more controlled the situation is), the wiser he can become.
d. The more powerful his ethical system is in helping him to make practical decisions and correct instrumental decisions, the wiser he can become.
But to be wiser is not necessarily to be wise.
Corollary 2. If a man cannot be wise, that is also saying he cannot be moral. His ethical system may enable him to desire to be moral, but if his system cannot deliver sure justified moral decisions in advance, any adherent of the system can never in that system be a moral person. Moral in this sense is equivalent to being wise.
Corollary 3. Every imposition of one man’s will upon another against that second person’s will is an unjustified ego-trip. If no man is wise or moral, what justification is there for forcing one’s will upon another? All such force is unwise and immoral. That puts nearly all human social systems into the shambles of self-serving hypocrisy.